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a b s t r a c t
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is commonly deﬁned as a market-based environmental policy
instrument to efﬁciently achieve ecosystem services provision. However, an increasing body of literature
shows that this prescriptive conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in
practice, and that the commodiﬁcation of ecosystem services (ES) is problematic and may lead to unfair
situations for relevant PES actors. This paper synthesizes case studies in Indonesia, the Philippines and
Nepal to provide empirical observations on emerging PES mechanisms in Asia. Lessons learned show
that fairness and efﬁciency objectives must be achieved simultaneously in designing and implementing
a sustainable PES scheme, especially in developing country contexts. Neither fairness nor efﬁciency is a
primary aim but an intermediate ‘fairly efﬁcient and efﬁciently fair’ PES may bridge the gap between PES
theory and practice to increase sustainable ES provision and improve livelihoods.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The real value of ecosystem services (ES) to human well-being
is only partially included in market economics (De Groot, 1992;
Turner et al., 1994). Currently, conventional markets fail to reﬂect
the full or true value of services (the ‘welfare effect’) such as pure
water (eliminating the need for artiﬁcial puriﬁcation) or natural
pollination in enhancing crop yields. Conventional markets also
rarely treat or even neglect negative effects of economic activities
on ES or in economic term, externalities, most of which are, public
goods. As one of several possible policy responses, market-based
instruments, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES), have
been developed to capture at least some of the ﬁnancial value of
these services through the monetisation and commodiﬁcation of
ES (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).
Initially, the PES concept was strictly deﬁned as a market-based
environmental policy instrument to achieve environmental protec-
tion in the most efﬁcient way (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al.,
2005). Efﬁciency means producing the greatest social value (deter-
mined subjectively by individuals and measured by economists
either in markets or by using non-market valuation methods) for
the least possible (social) cost. In short, efﬁciency is achieved when
net value is maximised, ideally resulting in positive net beneﬁts.
This is based on the principle ‘you get what you pay for’ for positive
effects from the ﬂow of ES (Wunder, 2007). The ‘efﬁciency’ line of
argumentation on PES among scientists and practitioners is that a
PES instrument should not be burdened by additional social equity
goals in achieving the environmental quality, natural capital con-
servation and cost effectiveness goals of sustainable ES provision.
The ideal PES schemes based on environmental and cost-efﬁciency
principles should “integrate ecosystem services into markets and
should be like any other market transaction” (Farley and Costanza,
2010). This is supported by the assumption articulated by Coase
(1960) over 50 years ago that effective legal structures and enforce-
able policy rights exist to overcome the problems of current market
failures. Nevertheless, recent literature shows that the Coasean and
pure market approach that dominate the conceptualisation of PES
cannot be easily generalised or implemented in practice (Muradian
et al., 2013, 2010). The concept also disregards equity issues because
the aggregate of gains and losses by different economic agents is
counted as more important than how they are distributed in society
(Pascual et al., 2010).
Kosoy and Corbera (2010) further argued that the commodiﬁca-
tion of ES is problematic because it promotes efﬁciency over fairness.
Case studies in Latin America showed that social values beyond
ﬁnancial payments induced participation in PES (Kosoy et al., 2007)
and the monetisation of ecosystem services were mostly rejected
by the PES recipients (Asquith et al., 2008). However, a potential
combination of equity and efﬁciency may be possible (Pascual et al.,
2010). Thus, there is a clear need to adjust Coase’s argument and
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incorporate the context and perspective of local stakeholders
(Adhikari and Boag, 2013; van Noordwijk et al., 2013), particularly
when PES schemes are applied in the context of developing countries
with skewed wealth distribution, contested property rights, low law
enforcement and weak institutions (Neef and Thomas, 2009). A
recent review byWunder (2013) highlighted the importance of taking
the ecological-economics perspective (Costanza et al., 1997, 2004;
Farber et al., 2002) in analysing the applicability of PES focusing on
“the insistence on the importance of equity and the diversity of
institutional contexts”. Moreover, in the perspective of developing
countries, the inclusion of a poverty-alleviation, rural empowerment
and social justice goals might be considered when a PES scheme deals
with historical imbalances in the power, right and wealth status
between ES suppliers and beneﬁciaries (Swallow et al., 2009).
It is essential to embrace the perspective of multidimensional
poverty in analysing local perspectives on PES outcomes beyond their
household income increment (van Noordwijk et al., 2004). In many
cases, poverty deﬁned simply as the inadequacy of income is still
common in the literature on human deprivation. However, this view
lacks the understanding that income inﬂuences people’s ways of living
and also contributes to the impoverishment of life (Sen, 2000). The
perspectives on poverty inescapably surpass the notion of welfare
utility and encompass a broader range of capabilities (Kahneman et al.,
1997; Sen, 1999; Wegner and Pascual, 2011), including the capabilities
of pursuing individual happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Kubiszewski
et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to seek evidence and support
the theory of plural dimensions of human well-being when incorpor-
ating poverty reduction elements to the PES design and implementa-
tion (Wegner and Pascual, 2011).
The broad understanding of PES in Asian countries is, however, still
limited, particularly regarding the analysis of how to balance efﬁciency
and fairness involved in changing land use, socio-cultural values and
the behaviour of relevant stakeholders. In current discussions, efﬁ-
ciency refers to ES additionally gained by clearly linking land-use
practices contracted under a PES scheme and ES provisions and the
cost effectiveness of the scheme. Fairness refers to pro-poor aspects of
PES, where marginalised actors of the potential scheme, be they men
or women, have non-biased (or preferential) opportunities in partici-
pating, planning, designing, implementing and monitoring the
scheme, and getting beneﬁts from it. Fairness also embeds stakeholder
perceptions on what is fair beyond quantiﬁable equal distribution.
Much of the discussion on PES is about the degree to which and the
way ‘efﬁciency’ and ‘fairness’ objectives can be reconciled.
While there are multiple and partly contrasted views on the
theoretical basis (‘theory of change’) of how individual and collective
human behaviours can be inﬂuenced to internalize the environmental
externalities, a growing body of empirical evidence of apparently con-
tradicting ﬁndings needs to be contextualized to frame ‘theories of
place’ of which approach might work where, and to which degree.
Here, we review experience in Asia to contribute to such theories. Our
main hypothesis is that practices in developing countries mostly rule
out fair PES if the PES deﬁnition is strictly applied as a market-based
or commodiﬁcation of ES. The case studies in Indonesia, the Philip-
pines and Nepal presented in this paper aim to contribute to the
debate that successful PES implementation needs to simultaneously
achieve efﬁciency and fairness objectives if it is to provide sustainable
solutions that achieve both an increase in ES provision and the
enhancement of livelihoods (natural, human, physical, social and
ﬁnancial capitals).
1.1. Reward or payment? Environmental or ecosystem services? A
contribution to basic deﬁnitions
The solution of environmental problems in developing countries
(including the overexploitation of natural capital as well as the
loss of biodiversity and ecosystem quality as a result of pollution),
speciﬁcally in Asia, requires the emphasis of the dual goals of
poverty alleviation and environmental conservation (Tinbergen,
1976; UN, 1992). PES is seen as an instrument to help achieve these
goals (Muradian et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2010; van Noordwijk and
Leimona, 2010). Proponents of fairness dimensions as elements that
need to be added to effectiveness and efﬁciency prefer the use of
the broader concept of ‘rewards’ (RES) rather than ‘payments’ for
environmental services (Gouyon, 2003; Swallow et al., 2009; van
Noordwijk et al., 2004). The notion of RES focuses on the “multiple
goals of ecological sustainability, just distribution and economic
efﬁciency and favours a variety of payment mechanisms to achieve
these goals, both market and non-market” (Farley and Costanza,
2010; Muradian et al., 2010). RES proposes the integration of anti-
poverty elements into economic instruments to enhance environ-
mental services with the basic argument that poverty alleviation
has to be included in any portfolio to protect the environment,
especially in developing countries.
The term ‘RES’ also offers broader recognition to ES providers, not
only focusing on ﬁnancial transactions between stakeholders but also
including in-kind rewards, such as access to land, access to markets,
capacity building and the recognition of identity and rights (van
Noordwijk et al., 2004). Swallow et al. (2009) introduced the term
‘compensation and reward for environmental services’ to refer to “a
range of mechanisms linking ecosystem stewards and environmental
service beneﬁciaries, including the mechanisms normally included
under the term payment for ecosystem service”. They noted that the
relationships between ecosystem stewards, environmental service
beneﬁciaries and intermediaries may be more complex than a simple
transaction, with agreements that are not wholly voluntary, and
payments that are not wholly conditional. In general, the paper uses
‘payments for ecosystem services’ as a more common term and argues
that the current trend shows that ‘payment for ecosystem services’
have been used to explain some cases with pro-poor elements on its
design. Therefore, shifts from the original concept of PES have existed
and will be strengthened by this paper.
Furthermore, we also acknowledge these arguments using the
terms ‘payments for environmental services’ and ‘payments for
ecosystem services’. Environmental services and ecosystem services
are two important concepts widely used in the academic and
empirical literature to discuss environmental policy, sometimes as
synonyms, sometimes with different delineations. The concept of
‘services’ in both terms refers to the ﬂow of beneﬁts obtained by
people. Ecosystem services are interpreted as the ﬂow of beneﬁts
from natural capital (including all species) to human beings (MA,
2005; Wegner and Pascual, 2011). Ecosystem services include
‘provisioning’ services for which markets may exist and function
well, plus regulating, cultural and supporting services that tend to
be ‘externalities’ of decision making. Some authors use the term
‘environmental services’ for ecosystem services beyond provision-
ing (van Noordwijk et al., 2012). Others have deﬁned environmental
services as the broader concept of all human beneﬁts derived from
natural and/or actively managed landscapes, which involve natural
capital as part of their production function, often alongside social
and human capital and aspects of built-up infrastructure. In this
view, ecosystem services are considered a subcategory of environ-
mental services, provided by ‘natural’ subsystems (Muradian et al.,
2010; Swallow et al., 2009) or even “a systematically different
category” (Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013).
In theory, the notion of environmental services is “input-based
and focused on the efforts undertaken by actors to generate environ-
mental improvements and improved natural capital”, and the notion
of ecosystem services is “outcome-based and focused on the well-
being beneﬁts provided to society from natural capital” (Greiner,
2010). As the debate continues, we envisage the model of ecosystem
services from the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)
diagram as a conceptual improvement of the Millennium Assessment
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(MA) diagram (Braat and de Groot, 2012). The authors recognised
ecosystem services as “a combination of natural (ecosystem process-
based) energies with human energies”. Thus, this paper focuses on
PES in the case of payments to the provider of ecosystem services
produced through the interaction of human intervention and ecosys-
tem processes.
2. Socioeconomic context of the PES schemes in Asia
This paper synthesises the ﬁndings from a decade of action and
learning in the sites (2002–2012) that are part of the Rewarding
Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) project of the
World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Southeast Asia Region (Fig. 1).
Nine sites in three countries, i.e. Indonesia (Kapuas Hulu–West
Kalimantan, Singkarak–West Sumatra, Bungo–Jambi, Sumberjaya–
Lampung), the Philippines (Kalahan–Nueva Vizcayas, Bakun–Ben-
quet, Lantapan–Bukidnon) and Nepal (Kulekhani–Makwanpur)
become the focus of this study where the project conducted action
research sites (Leimona, 2011).
2.1. The landscape
Following the agro-ecological zones of Hadi and van Noordwijk
(2005) and conﬁgurations of forest and landscape transitions of van
Noordwijk et al. (in press), some combinations of agro-ecological
zones (ranging from tree-based landscapes, intensive agriculture
and the urban land-use system) were distinguished in these sites to
analyse the potential for establishment of payments for ecosystem
services (Fig. 2, Table 1 and Annex 1). Kalahan and Kapuas Hulu
sites are examples of the Conﬁguration I of the forest and landscape
transitions characterized by forest still inseparable part of the local
livelihoods. In Kulekhani and Bakun, the segregation of forest and
agriculture described for Conﬁguration II is apparent as agriculture
prevails due to several reasons, mostly population pressures and
high demand of marketable crops, particularly horticulture and
vegetables. In Conﬁguration III as found in Sumberjaya, Bungo and
Cidanau, agroforests and agroforestry systems have become very
important parts of the landscapes and people’s livelihood. The
systems connect the forest (mostly protected for providing
watershed services of the urban beneﬁciaries) and the intensive
but limited crops located mostly in the riparian zones. Agroforests
supply most of the ecosystem service provisions. Conﬁguration IV
as represented by Lantapan and Singkarak in our data represents
the landscape that once has experienced severe degradation and is
in a process of recovery. This last conﬁguration is patchier com-
pared to others where natural forests support the agriculture and
agroforestry systems for providing the provisioning services of
income and food.
2.2. The community
In Asian rural areas, traditional land and resource management
systems fail owing to population increase and the diminishing of
land leading to overuse. Skewed land distribution often compels the
poor to survive by cultivating marginal land, leading to erosion.
Without tenure and often with only passing claims on the land they
cultivate, the poor are less likely to make investments to protect
natural resources (Brandon and Ramankutty, 1993; van Noordwijk
et al., 2002). Market imperfection and policy distortion that neglect
the social and economic importance of ecosystems are claimed as
the root causes of environmental problems in Asia (TEEB, 2010;
Tomich et al., 2004).
These socioeconomic conditions were apparent in the nine
research sites in three countries (i.e. Indonesia, the Philippines
and Nepal) as shown on Table 2. The ES providers in these sites are
smallholders with average landholding of 2 ha either indigenous
people or long-resided migrants acculturation with local cultures.
Insecure access to land tenure is common in all sites. However,
some communities have received legal permits to manage their
forests, such as in Kalahan and Bakun, and partly in Sumberjaya and
Kulekhani. In Kapus Hulu, Singkarak and Bungo, collective owner-
ship of land is still practiced among community members. Private
ownership dominates the farmers in Cidanau and Lantapan.
Most of the sites focus on rewards for watershed services under
private and public schemes. Two sites (Singkarak, Indonesia; and
Kalahan, the Philippines) test the voluntary carbon market and
one (Bungo, Indonesia) seeks opportunities for an eco-certiﬁcation
scheme of rubber agroforestry. The stages of implementation are
also varied, ranging from initial development of PES where the
intermediary partners conduct scoping studies of mature schemes
where contractual agreements have been signed, and schemes are
ready to be increased in scale. Action research on the sites
followed the principles of boundary work and negotiation support
Fig. 1. Action research sites as the focus analysis of the study.
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with problem-solving efforts to make schemes work in local
contexts combined with reﬂection on the underlying challenges
of reﬁning the conceptualisation. Therefore, we focus not only on
the established and operational cases but also the ones that have
not been successful yet.
3. Main ﬁndings
3.1. Co-investment in environmental stewardship as opposed to a
strict and prescriptive PES deﬁnition
In our case studies, the precondition for the Coasean conceptua-
lisation of PES was hardly met. The reasons for this, among others,
were a lack of data and the capability to measure, map, model, value
and monitor ES with multiple scales; unclear property rights; a lack
of sustainable funding; and close links between poverty and envir-
onmental degradation as commonly observed in the case studies.
Lack of data and capability were found in most of the cases. The
Kalahan Education Foundation is the most advanced site in collecting
data of biodiversity and carbon stock. However, it does not guarantee
the quality of the data when the ES provider group has to prepare
a business case for PES transaction and no transaction has been made
until currently. While most of the sites were facilitated by NGOs as
intermediaries, more long-term capacity support that is expected
from the government as the ‘permanent’ facilitator is lax. In addition,
these Asian cases mostly placed ES providers as a more marginalised
community group with low formal education and lack of access to
information and justice. As showed in the fraction of non-forest land
per capita (Table 1) that the proﬁle of ES providers in Asia contrasts
with the ones in Latin America, particularly in Costa Rica where the
categorization of smallholders are farmers with less than 30 ha farm
lands. In Asia, the majority of smallholders cultivate less than 2 ha of
farm lands with uncertain access to land.
Supported by the Heredia Declaration of Payments for Ecosystem
Services (Farley and Costanza, 2010), our cases show that PES in the
form of ES commodiﬁcation is not feasible for watershed services in
our Asian case studies under this current condition. ‘Commodiﬁca-
tion’ implies strict conditionality of PES, where tangible beneﬁts for
ES providers are conditional on the actual enhanced delivery of ES.
Our River Case in Sumberjaya was speciﬁcally designed to test this
condition (Pasha et al., 2012). The payment was based on the
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Fig. 2. Land use fractions presenting conﬁguration of forest and landscape transitions.
Table 1
Basic statistics of demography and land use in the nine case study areas around 2010 (HDI Data: 2009–2013).
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Spatial Analysis Unit of World Agroforestry Centre
Conﬁguration I Conﬁguration II Conﬁguration III Conﬁguration IV
Kalahan Kapuas Hulu Kulekhani Bakun Sumber-jaya Bungo Cidanau Lantapan Singkarak
Human population density, km2 36 4 355 69 130 70 613 150 90
HDI 0.72 0.71 0.50 0.74 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.67 0.75
Forest fraction 0.74 0.91 0.44 0.42 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.32 0.17
(ha per capita) 27.00 19.10 0.12 0.60 0.19 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.18
Agroforestry and tree crops 0.00 0.03 0.00 No data 0.46 0.60 0.39 0.19 0.17
(ha per capita) 0.10 0.60 0.00 No data 0.35 0.85 0.07 0.13 0.18
Rice ﬁeld fraction No data 0.00 0.08 No data 0.13 No data 0.27 0.03 0.17
(ha per capita) 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.19
Crop (non-paddy) lands 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.15
(ha per capita) 2.78 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.17
Other land 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.44 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.03
(ha per capita) 6.75 1.20 0.03 0.63 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
Settlement 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.08
(ha per capita) 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.05 1.42 0.01 0.01 0.09
Reservoir/ Water body No data No data 0.02 No data 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.11
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percentage of sedimentation reduced by the farmers. As biophysical
scientists recognize that the supply of ecological goods and services
is uncertain because of climate change and other threats, a commo-
diﬁcation approach shifts this risk to the farmers. It may be efﬁcient
for the beneﬁciaries since they do not have to pay when the targeted
ES is not reached, however, it might not be pro-poor because
farmers shoulder the biophysical uncertainties in provisioning ES.
In our ﬁrst pilot in Sumberjaya, after the farmers completed about
80% of constructing a simple technology to reduce sediments, a
landslide coming from the state-forest ruined the construction and
farmers’ performance of the contract. Our second pilot showed that
despite the lower level of sedimentation achieved by the farmers,
the hydropower company rewarded the full amount of payment to
the farmers due to their appreciation for the farmers’ hard work.
Alternatively to bring the theory of PES conditionality closer to
practice, we observed a stratiﬁcation of conditionality rather than
strictly limit the actual and measurable ES as the outcome of PES.
This is also to respond the ‘PES-like’ term positively reﬂecting in
different PES practices in developing countries. We categorize the
PES strata based on their different outcomes as earlier introduced
by van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010). Those strata are: level I:
when the tangible beneﬁts for the ES providers conditional on the
actual measured ES (such as percentage of sediment reduced,
percentage water quality improved); level II: when farmers are
evaluated based on the performance of agro-ecosystems in a
desirable state (such as quantity, quality and composition of trees
on their farm lands); level III: when farmers are evaluated by the
implementation of agreed actions to enhance ES (such as plant
Table 2
Research sites and the status of the applied PES scheme.
Site Started
in
Socio-political-economic conditions Main ES Scheme Status
Conﬁguration I
Kalahan (Villamor
and Lasco, 2006)
2002 Indigenous people with strong cohesion
recognized by the national law to self-managed
their ancestral lands
Carbon
sequestration
(voluntary)
Financial payment from national
companies
Initial negotiation with
potential buyers
Kapuas Hulu, West
Kalimantan
(Lusiana et al.,
2008)
2008 Indigenous people as hunter gatherers and local
communities as rubber smallholders as parts of
communities managing the upper watershed
Watershed
services for a
district water
company
Public conservation fund from the
district
Agreed public
conservation fund from
the district
Earmark payment from water bill
Conﬁguration II
Kulekhani (Joshi,
2011)
2002 Local community provided forest management
rights practicing intensive fallow rotations and
free-roaming cattle
Watershed
services for a
private HEP
Distribution of HEP’s royalty to the
community
Agreed share of royalty
Bakun (Villamor
and Lasco, 2009)
2004 Indigenous people investing their lands for high
market-value vegetables with remaining forest
certiﬁed as ancestral domain
Watershed
services for
private HEPs
Distribution of HEP’s royalty to the
community
Agreed share of royalty
Conﬁguration III
Bungo, Jambi
(Leimona and
Joshi, 2010)
2002 Local community preserving jungle rubber or old
agroforestry rubber pressured by oil palm
Agro-
biodiversity
conservation of
jungle rubber
Financial payment from a philanthropic
scheme
Ad hoc reward for a micro-
hydropower unit
Eco-certiﬁcation for jungle rubber Price transparency from a
large-scale tire company
for rubber slabs coming
from rubber agroforests
Sumberjaya,
Lampung (Pasha
et al., 2012)
2002 Local community, mostly migrants cultivating
coffee agroforestry struggling for formal
recognitions of their land use practices in
maintaining watershed functions
Watershed
services, mainly
sedimentation
reduction
5 to 25 year certiﬁcate of community-
based forestry
Agreed 1-year contract
extended to other sites
“Conditional CSR” from a parastatal HEP
company
Cidanau, West Java
(Leimona et al.,
2010)
2001 Local community in a rural-urban area practicing
fruit-based agroforestry and subsistence rainfed
rice ﬁeld
Watershed
services for
domestic and
industrial
demands
“Conditional CSR” from a water
company
Agreed 5-year contracts in
four villages
Conﬁguration IV
Singkarak, West
Sumatra
(Leimona et al.,
2006)
2002 Local community with strong traditional norms
cultivating food crops and rice ﬁelds for
commercial markets, traditional ﬁshing of high
value catches and agroforestry products with
remaining watershed protection forest
Watershed
services
Distribution of royalties from a state-
owned hydroelectric power (HEP)
company Financial payment from an
international carbon broker
Ad hoc share of royalty
Carbon
sequestration
(voluntary)
Agreed 10-year contract
over a total 49 ha
Lantapan,
Bukidnon
(Catacutan et al.,
2010; Duque-
Piñon et al.,
2012)
2006 Local community and commercial large-scale
community side by side cultivating intensive
banana, pineapple and vegetable farms in the
buffer zone of the National Park
Watershed
services
Incentive-based policy by the Local
Government enacted by the Municipal
Ordinance No. 114/2008
Agreed ‘family
conservation contracts’ in
Alanib sub-watershed by
the NPC
The National Power Company (NPC) to
implement a rewards’ mechanism for
watershed services
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riparian area to avoid collapsed riverbank, construct terracing); and
level IV: when farmers, mostly collectively, are evaluated based on
their commitment in implementing management plans to enhance
ES with respect for local sovereignty in conserving the environment
for both local and external beneﬁts.
Based on these levels of conditionality and the recognition
of PES practices in Asia, three distinct perspectives of PES can
coexist: (1) the commodiﬁcation of ES; (2) compensation for
opportunities that are skipped/forgone; and (3) co-investment in
environmental stewardship (van Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010;
van Noordwijk et al., 2012). Commodiﬁcation of ES operates at con-
ditionality level I with no explicit poverty targets with derivation
or the deﬁnition of standardised units of ES being traded. Com-
pensation for opportunities skipped/forgone is the payment to land
users for accepting restrictions on their use of land, with con-
ditionality at level II or III. These payments are mostly govern-
ment-mediated payments to offset the opportunity of more
ﬁnancially beneﬁcial land use. Co-investment in stewardship is
when enhancing ecosystem services, local and external stake-
holders prioritize mutual trust and jointly invest capitals in land-
use trajectories. Technically, the PES contracts between ES provi-
ders and buyers are ﬂexible with broad sanctions and monitoring
requirements.
Our case studies also showed that there are opportunities for
phased strategies. Co-investment in ES supported by the human and
social capital of the stakeholders is appropriate as a way to further
develop PES paradigms and can take in a much broader range of
values, including reconciling individual and group altruism (van
Noordwijk et al., 2012). After creating, for example, a basis of respect
and relationship through the co-investment paradigm, there may be
more space for the speciﬁc development of the commodiﬁcation para-
digm for the actual delivery of ES to meet conservation and additional
ES objectives (Pasha et al., 2012) (i.e. a PES scheme is additional when
the scheme increases ecosystem services compared to baselines with-
out a PES scheme). The Sumberjaya case shows that the relationship
between the hydropower company and farmer groups is beyond buyer
and seller transaction. The hydropower company recognized that as
the beneﬁciary, they also had responsibility in maintaining the water-
shed and this has to be done jointly with the communities. As a
consequence, they agreed to modify the next step to reﬂect such
collaboration, while building better indicators in measuring ES within
the PES contract. This indicates dynamic and ﬂexible process of PES on
the ﬁeld, while theoretically modifying its concept.
When we tested the co-investment concept towards landscapes
in four conﬁgurations, yet, for all conﬁgurations co-investment has
emerged as the primary paradigm. As the baseline, different nuances
on the relationship between communities’ right, ES stewardship and
‘payment’ exist as land tenureship is contested. The contrast between
Conﬁgurations II and III, with or without agroforests as primary
source of ES in the landscape, has major consequences of who can
expect or claim to be providers of ES that deserve to be rewarded. In
Conﬁguration II, they can vary from the managers, guardians and
stewards of remaining patches of forests, often the state or those
who get permits from the state, such as the ancestral domain in
Bakun. In Conﬁguration III, ES providers are the ones who manage
and own the agroforests, at least in local perspective. In practice,
however, the agroforests may have been (erroneously) classiﬁed as
state forests, and an essentially ﬁrst co-investment step towards
conﬂict resolution and progress is in the state’s recognition of local
stewardship as clearly shown in Bungo, Jambi in the form of Village
Forest or Hutan Desa (Akiefnawati et al., 2010) and in Sumberjaya
Lampung as the Community Forest or Hutan Kemasyarakatan
(Suyanto, 2007). Overcoming deeply engrained negative perspectives
by state forest managers on shifting cultivation in Conﬁguration I
(van Noordwijk et al., 2008), requires similar steps to achieve the
trust levels needed for co-investment. The restoration context of
Conﬁguration IV similarly requires that basic issues of land and re-
source tenure are clariﬁed.
3.2. A shared understanding of multiple types of ecological
knowledge in providing and managing ES to increase the efﬁciency
and fairness of PES schemes
One of the main problems of any PES scheme is that there are
widely held assumptions between changes in land cover and ES
provision. We observed that the proposed solutions for environ-
mental problems, including increases in ES provision, are mostly
based on the relative merits of reforestation, which emphasise that
ES is provided only by natural forests but not by other land uses.
Furthermore, standardised solutions to natural resource manage-
ment are usually land-rehabilitation projects that are too narrowly
deﬁned. For example, planting trees often neglect other landscape
management techniques and concerns, such as constructing a
simple sedimentation retainer along a riparian zone to maintain
the watershed functions.
In natural resource management, different stakeholders may, in
fact, have opposite interests in utilising a landscape. From the policy
perspective, agroforestry-mosaic landscapes, which are found in
many Asian countries, can offer excellent opportunities to combine
economic and environmental targets. In these landscapes, farmers
combine elements of the natural forests that provide ES with trees for
productive purposes and intensive food cropping systems (Jellinek
et al., 2013; van Noordwijk et al., 2002). However, potential ES buyers
and policy makers in general sometimes fail to recognise these agro-
forestry systems. For example, agricultural landscapes may not meet
the legal deﬁnitions of ‘forest’ or be in conﬂict with the existing land-
use regulation system and policies even though the land practices can
provide ES at similar levels as forest ecosystems.
The appreciation of the various quantitative ES indicators probably
differs by stakeholder group. To ensure an established PES, it is essen-
tial to understand these ES indicators from the multiple ecological
perspectives. These perspectives come from both upstream and
downstream local communities (i.e. local ecological knowledge), the
general public and policy makers (i.e. public ecological knowledge),
and ecological modellers or hydrologists (i.e. modeller ecological
knowledge) (van Noordwijk et al., 2013). In Singkarak (Farida et al.,
2005), for example, the upper stream farmers were blamed for
deforestation causing reduced water quantity of the lake as the source
for hydropower electricity generator and decreased harvestable local
ﬁsh due to high siltation. However, the scientiﬁc data proved that the
water quantity of the lake was more inﬂuenced by the amount and
frequency of the rainfall, while the reduction of the ﬁsh was mostly
due to overharvesting by the downstream ﬁshermen.
The multiple ecological knowledge approach combines efﬁciency
and fairness components in its application at the pilot sites. The
scientiﬁc hydrological assessment as the source of ‘modeller ecolo-
gical knowledge’ clariﬁes the real problems of the watershed, offers
appropriate land management and hydrological monitoring proce-
dures and avoids unrealistic targets of the PES schemes. These
aspects support in increasing the efﬁciency of the PES. Complemen-
tarily, the understanding of the ‘local ecological knowledge’ through
a series consultation and focus group discussion with the commu-
nities enables designing a mechanism that is sensitive to local
capacity and their knowledge in managing their landscape. Overall,
the approach clariﬁes the expectations of relevant stakeholders in
the watershed: the communities as the ES providers, the public ES
beneﬁciaries and the intermediaries. This contributes to fairness in
designing the PES project.
Beyond its potential, however, the issue of strategic use of
information (Martín-López et al., 2014), a discrepancy between
scale in the provision of ES and its investment and the vested
interests of intermediaries and donors hinder the optimal use of
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such multiple knowledge analysis in designing and implementing
rewards for the schemes for watershed services. The case study in
Kapuas Hulu (Lusiana et al., 2008) also shows that the availability
of information is only a prerequisite for increasing the quality and
sustainability of PES schemes. Interviews with practitioners in this
study found that the factors inﬂuencing the design and imple-
mentation of PES programs are varied and beyond the availability
of multi-perception knowledge and scientiﬁc data. The hydrologi-
cal assessment in Kapuas Hulu resulted that the watershed still
had good functions in providing its services and the river siltation
was caused by boats cutting the edge of the river bank rather than
the farming practices of smallholders. The assessment also recom-
mended that another scheme, such as carbon stock protection at
the upper watershed, may be a more effective solution. However,
since the Kapuas Hulu case was designed as a ‘payment for
watershed services’ project thus the manager could not change
the project design easily.
3.3. Anti-poverty PES to adapt to local conditions in designing the
types, forms and expected levels of payments
We analysed the contribution of actual cash from beneﬁciaries to
individual ES providers to alleviate poverty and proved that such a
design has to attentively consider some key ratios of the relative
number of service providers and beneﬁciaries and their income-per-
capita measures (Leimona et al., 2009b). The analysis of income and
spatial data of Indonesian agro-ecosystems indicated that a modestly
increased target of 5% of the annual disposable income of upstream
rural households may be difﬁcult to be achieved given the population
and income structure of downstream and upstream areas.
Identifying payments that match with people’s needs and expec-
tations, is one particularly important aspect of anti-poverty PES
approaches. The ﬁndings from focus-group discussions at the differ-
ent sites (Leimona et al., 2009b) suggest that there is a substantial
variation between communities concerning poverty concepts and
payment preferences. Hence, anti-poverty PES is heterogeneous and
highly context-dependent (Adhikari and Boag, 2013). This provides
important insights into the various dimensions that well-targeted
reward schemes need to address. Our analysis concluded that pay-
ments in the forms of human, social and physical capital – or what
are often referred to as non-ﬁnancial incentives – are very often the
most preferred, and most feasible, types of payments: public social
investments, such as education and health services (i.e. human
capital) as mentioned by almost potential ES participants; good road
conditions (i.e. physical capital) as in Cidanau, where farmers are
unable to timely market their perishable fruit harvests from their
agroforestry gardens due to bad road conditions; the security of land
tenure as mentioned by people in Bakun and Sumberjaya, who had
experienced severe violence due to insecure land tenure; recognition
as an environmental champion as expected by the Kalahan commu-
nity, who are applying sustainable landscape management for deca-
des but still have difﬁculties in gaining ES buyers; and the develop-
ment of trust with the government in maintaining an intact enviro-
nment (i.e. social capital). In developing countries as described in this
study, these public investments are less well delivered compared to
the industrialized ones. Therefore, these aspects, combined with high
social cohesion that deﬁes the concept of free-riding (i.e. we don’t
mind our neighbour enjoying our payments from maintaining good
ES, and we prefer that everybody is happy, support the preference for
non-ﬁnancial payments).
3.4. A multidimensional approach to poverty and livelihoods to
enable a broader analysis of local perspectives on PES
When examining local perspectives on PES outcomes, all case
study analyses employed a multidimensional perspective of poverty,
drawing to some extent on the Sustainable Livelihood Approach
originally developed by Chambers and Conway (1992). This approach
is a uniﬁed concept of wellbeing that encompasses both economic
and non-economic aspects, and it has been used both for project
design and the evaluation of impacts (Ashley and Hussein, 2000).
Therefore, the livelihood capitals offered by this approach provides
multidimensionality on how outcomes of a scheme can be assessed.
The Cidanau case showed that beneﬁts were mostly non-
ﬁnancial, including expanded social networks with external stake-
holders, the increased knowledge and capacity of the community
and investments in small-scale public infrastructure (Leimona et al.,
2010; Pasha et al., 2012). Direct ﬁnancial beneﬁt was limited. The
fraction of PES payment was only about three percent of the total
income in Cidanau. We observed, in most cases, that non-ﬁnancial
beneﬁts combined with recognition from governments and external
stakeholders were enough incentive to foster farmers’ commitment
to a scheme. When ﬁnancial payment was given, adjusting the
value of new contracts was important so that farmers could cover
their true opportunity cost. However, our ﬁnding at the Sumberjaya
case revealed that most of the schemes could not cover farmers’
true opportunity costs because of the buyers’ limited funds (Ajayi
et al., 2012; Leimona et al., 2009a). Furthermore, in Kulekhani,
Bakun and Singkarak, if the royalty of hydropower company is
distributed proportionally to all the upper stream households, each
household will receive less than one US$ annually.
Although the PES schemes did not drastically change the liveli-
hoods of participants, particularly their ﬁnancial capital, links with
external stakeholders created opportunities for participants to diver-
sify, or capture greater value from, their income sources. The Cidanau
case showed that exposure to these partners also increased the parti-
cipants’ knowledge of conservation, their skills to manage their
farmers’ organisation, and helped to build networks to improve their
businesses and implementation of the PES scheme. It also highlighted
the need for awareness of the social dynamics between participants
and non-participants to design beneﬁt packages that minimise com-
munity conﬂict. The literature on PES mentions that conditional
monetary PES forming an extrinsic motivation might crowd out the
intrinsic motivation of people to do something right for society (Farley
and Costanza, 2010). Experience from the behavioural economics and
psychology ﬁelds show that even simple reminders of money made
people act in an independent and socially insensitive manner (van
Noordwijk et al., 2012). Furthermore, experiments showed that
people might commit more effort in exchange for no payment, such
as in social markets where reciprocity is expected, rather than when
they receive low cash payments, such as in a monetarymarket (Ariely,
2009; Heyman and Ariely, 2004).
Table 3 provides an overview of the links between theoretical
perspectives on PES and their empirical implementation in Asia.
4. Conclusions
The case studies of PES in Asia experienced shifting perspectives,
from legitimating cost-efﬁcient and effective natural resource
management to concerns about fairness in the design and beneﬁt
distribution of the scheme. The monetisation and commodiﬁcation
of ES through PES can create technical problems in simultaneously
addressing efﬁciency and fairness outcomes; it also raises ethical
arguments by obscuring cultural, political and social relationships in
environmental service generation as also discussed by Kosoy and
Corbera (2010).
Five main conclusions are drawn. First, the empirical observation of
emerging PES mechanisms in the Asian case studies indicate that the
performance of PES to simultaneously achieve efﬁciency and fairness
objectives is strongly inﬂuenced by complex behaviour and decision
making at the individual level. This behaviour is seen not only in ES
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Table 3
Summary of PES theories and ﬁndings from Asian cases.
Literature basis (with the
dominant efﬁciency domain)
Assumption Fact (with fairness contextually
emerging)
Hypothesis Findings from the study
1. Co-investment in environmental stewardship as opposed to a strict and prescriptive PES deﬁnition
The dominant conceptual
approach towards PES is
derived from Coasean
economics, and PES is
primarily a way to improve
economic efﬁciency
(Muradian et al., 2010)
Poverty alleviation is a positive
“side effect” and should be
targeted as long as the
inclusion does not imply
efﬁciency losses (Pagiola
et al., 2005)
A market-based instrument is
efﬁcient in internalizing
environmental externalities by
‘getting the price right’
A normative vision of efﬁciency
improvement as a guiding
principle may create a mismatch
between theory and practice
(Pascual et al., 2010)
Preconditions for application of
the PES concept with strict
conditionality are not met in the
context of many developing
countries, and a wider PES
interpretation is needed (van
Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010)
In practice, strict conditionality
cannot be met among ES
providers, intermediaries and
beneﬁciaries involved in PES
contracts
The analysis of the research
sites in Asia suggests that
broader perspectives of PES (i.
e., commoditized ES,
compensation for
opportunities forgone and co-
investment in environmental
stewardship) may well become
the foundation to
simultaneously achieve the
efﬁciency and fairness
objectives of PES schemes
2. A shared understanding of multiple ecological knowledge in providing and managing ES to increase efﬁciency and fairness of PES schemes
PES schemes that aim at
obtaining efﬁcient outcomes
must have well-deﬁned ES
All ES providers participate and
voluntarily negotiate with ES
buyers with balanced power
PES schemes are likely to change
(and sometimes reinforce)
existing power structures and
inequalities in decision making
and access to resources, with
signiﬁcant equity implications
(Corbera et al., 2007; Jack et al.,
2008; Pascual et al., 2010)
Reducing discrepancies and
improving the synergies of
ecological knowledge of all
actors in PES increases the
effectiveness of a PES scheme
Integration of stakeholders’
knowledge and perceptions in
designing PES can increase
efﬁciency by clarifying
expectations from all relevant
actors, avoiding unrealistic
targets for the quality of
watershed services, helping
deﬁne conditionality of PES
and offering appropriate
monitoring procedures, and
improving PES fairness by
reducing conﬂicts and
accepting multiple
perspectives
Experience with the strategic
use of information and vested
interests of intermediaries and
donors implies that credibility,
salience and legitimacy of
knowledge for any PES scheme
needs to be secured before it
can be used in actual
negotiations
3. Anti-poverty PES to adapt to local conditions in designing the types, forms and expected levels of payments
PES schemes are more cost
effective than other
approaches in the
conservation and poverty
alleviation nexus, such as
integrated conservation and
development projects
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002)
PES directly targets land
managers who provide ES, and
payment (mostly ﬁnancial) must
be sufﬁcient relative to income
and at least commensurate with
opportunity costs
Relative numbers and wealth of
ES providers and beneﬁciaries
are varied, thus the willingness
and ability to pay may be lower
than willingness to accept of ES
providers
Only under speciﬁc
circumstances will cash
incentives from PES contribute
substantially to increase
disposable income and alleviate
poverty for ES providers
Anti-poverty PES can only have
a signiﬁcant effect on rural
income if it (1) involves
upstream providers who have
low population density and/or
a small area relative to the
beneﬁciaries; (2) involves
downstream beneﬁciaries who
have relatively higher income
than the upstream providers;
(3) provides highly critical and
non-substitutable ES; (4) is
efﬁcient and has low
opportunity and transaction
costs but high willingness and
ability to pay of downstream
beneﬁciaries
4. A multidimensional approach to poverty and livelihoods to enable a broader analysis of local perspectives on PES
Monetization of ES is the basis
for enhancing the efﬁciency
of environmental policy and
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providers as the main actors in PES but also in beneﬁciaries, inter-
mediaries and supporters (e.g. governments and international agents).
The motivations and perceptions of stakeholders drive relationships,
and political interest in PES can further shape the design and imple-
mentation of any scheme. A language of ‘co-investment in environ-
mental stewardship’ may be more conducive to the respect, mutual
accountability and commitment to sustainable development. There-
fore, we envision PES as a joint and voluntary investment between ES
providers and beneﬁciaries in a binding agreement under different
degrees of conditionality for the provision of ES. The paper also high-
lighted phased strategies in ES provision under a dynamic and ﬂexible
contractual agreement. When the social and political preconditions
(such as basic respect and relationships among stakeholders) have
been met, there likely is greater space for real actions in delivering
measurable ES to meet conservation objectives. The tentative classiﬁ-
cation of the landscapes in four conﬁgurations, as an initial theory of
place, does help to contextualize the generic theories of change.
Second, in addition to ﬁnancial payments, non-ﬁnancial pay-
ments probably are an important incentive for ES providers. These
payments have weaknesses, such as giving indirect beneﬁts to ES
providers and this reduces the effectiveness of the payment and
can trigger ‘free riders’ and patronage effects. Nevertheless, in-
kind payments are often the most feasible transfer owing to the
often small budget for PES from ES beneﬁciaries, which is not able
to cover the full opportunity costs of the providers. Moreover, in-
kind payments avoid neglecting non-participants and align with
the social cohesiveness that characterises rural communities in
most developing countries.
Third, the application of multiple ecological knowledge types (i.e.
local, public and scientiﬁc ecological knowledge and the associated
ways of learning, rejecting and augmenting what is considered to be
knowledge) can support the establishment of efﬁcient and fair PES
schemes. Clarifying problems in the provision of ES and recom-
mending solutions at each spatial scale leads to more realistic
expectations of all stakeholders in implementing PES schemes. The
roles of each actor are then well-recognised and solutions are based
on local contexts rather than on standardised ones, leading to
mutual responsibility among PES actors.
Fourth, evaluating an established PES scheme using a sustainable
livelihoods framework can provide insight into how a PES scheme
can make stakeholders better or worse off. It can also fairly evaluate
project implementers because a broader view of impacts is captured.
Our Indonesian case suggests that the role of the intermediary is
very important and possibly dominant in establishing operational
PES schemes. An honest and trusted intermediary is thus one of the
key factors of a successful PES scheme. It also highlights the need
for the awareness of the social dynamics between participants and
non-participants and the design of beneﬁt packages to minimise
community level conﬂict.
Finally, the interdependency of fairness and efﬁciency is the
main consideration in designing and implementing a PES scheme
in developing countries. Interestingly, the emerging experience in
Africa on PES paradigms is well aligned with our ﬁndings for Asia
(Namirembe et al., 2014). The cases clearly show that PES is an
evolutionary process of landscape management involving multi-
stakeholders, and not an end result itself. Therefore, an adaptable
mechanism that is fairly efﬁcient and efﬁciently fair is likely to
bridge the gap between the academic approaches (or theories) and
the practical PES implementations on the ground.
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Annex 1. Site proﬁles of the study
Kalahan
Context
The Ikalahan people of Santa Fe in the northern Philippines
represented by the Kalahan Educational Foundation (KEF) signed a
Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government in 1974.
The agreement recognized the control of the Ikalahan indigenous
people covering about 15,000 ha of their ancestral land in exchange
for protecting forest from wildﬁres and watershed functions for the
users downstream.
State of action
Long before the PES concept introduced in this area, the KEF has
organized conservation efforts, such as training for your people,
Table 3 (continued )
Literature basis (with the
dominant efﬁciency domain)
Assumption Fact (with fairness contextually
emerging)
Hypothesis Findings from the study
correcting the market failure
of ES by capturing total
economic value of ES
(Gómez-Baggethun et al.,
2010)
Commodiﬁcation of ES
transforms natural capital
into ﬁnancial capital
Cash payments are frequently
viewed as having the highest
degree of ﬂexibility because they
can be converted to local goods
and services as prioritized by the
receivers
Cash payments for participating
individuals are mostly much
smaller than opportunity costs
Indirect, non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts at
the community level contribute
to reducing poverty or a
common-goods PES design
(Pascual et al., 2010)
Non-ﬁnancial incentives are
very often the most preferred
and possible types of
payments
PES schemes open links between
communities to various types of
capital
PES schemes do not drastically
change the livelihoods of
participants. Contributions to
the improved welfare of
participants so far are towards
social and human capital with
limited effects on ﬁnancial,
natural and physical capital
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establishing nurseries where seedlings of indigenous species were
produced and planting 50 trees per family each planting season (Rice
and Stidsen 2009). In 1994 funded by the Biodiversity Conservation
Network, the KEF started monitoring the biodiversity and carbon
stocks of their different forest types. In 2002, the KEF joined the
RUPES programme for developing more formal Project Identiﬁcation
Notes and approaching voluntary carbon buyers.
Kapuas Hulu
Context
Kapuas Hulu located in West Kalimantan is a region where
timber extractions, mostly by large-concessions and mining activ-
ities both legally and illegally happening. Ninety percent of this
watershed still covered by forest, the Dayak and Melayu people
live in this region as hunter gatherer community in the upper
stream bordering the National Park and smallholders cultivating
monoculture and agroforestry rubber gardens in the downstream
of the watershed. A local public water service is sourcing the water
from this watershed.
State of action
In 2008, the WWF Indonesia initiated a payment for watershed
service project. In collaboration with the World Agroforestry Centre,
a hydrological assessment was conducted highlighting that the
Kapuas Hulu is currently still able to maintain its watershed function,
particularly those related to maintaining river ﬂow (Lusiana et al.,
2008). However, the deforestation is increasing by approximately
130 km2 between 2001 and 2004, and there were already signs of
smaller catchment-scale degradation. Therefore, the district govern-
ment allocated approximately USD 20,000 annually for conserving
the Mendalam sub-watershed as part of the Kapuas Hulu basin. This
fund targets both the individual participants of the PWS programme
and villager in general with unclear percentage of allocations.
Kulekhani
Context
Kulekhani located in the north of Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital city
provides 17% of the country’s hydropower. High sedimentation into
the reservoir is the major problem, reducing its expected life time by
one third. In 1970s, the government handed over the responsibility
for forest conservation to local communities giving them manage-
ment and limited-use rights. As the government deemed Kulekhani
lands as ‘critical watershed of strategic importance’, it coordinated
government-led rehabilitation programmes that somehow bypassed
the local villagers’ perspective on watershed management. The state
hydroelectric company by law pays royalties to the central govern-
ment that then channels some of the royalties to the districts. These
payments are seen as a mix of ‘compensation’, corporate social
responsibility and tax.
State of action
In 2002, the RUPES programme facilitated options for mechan-
isms of reward transfer from the hydropower company to the
upland people. In late 2006, the Makwanpur DDC deposited USD
54,800 in a new Environmental Management Special Fund (EMSF)
for a year. The EMSF was managed by a newly established group
made of representatives from the Kulekhani communities. The
EMSF receives 20% of the royalty share of Makwanpur DDC, and
supported conservation and development programs proposed by
the communities.
Bakun
Context
The Kankana-ey-Bago people of Bakun was the ﬁrst indigenous
group to obtain a Certiﬁcate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) from
the Philippine Government in 2002. The CADT gave the tribe formal
title to its traditional lands organized by the Bakun Indigenous
Tribes Organization (BITO). The Kankana-ey have demonstrated
responsible stewardship of their natural resources through their
indigenous farming practices through a permanent farm for agro-
forestry providing supply of watershed services for the two down-
stream hydropower companies. Presented with growing demands
from urban areas for vegetables and the comparative economic
advantage of urban buyers, many farmers shifted their agroforestry
plots to plant temperate vegetables.
State of action
The hydropower company and local government agreed in
principle to allocate a portion of royalties from hydropower produc-
tion to the Bakun people for their environmental services. In 2006, an
estimated voluntary beneﬁt provided by HEC as of 2006 was USD
165,000.00. These beneﬁts could be perceived as company’s gesture
of goodwill in response to the urgent needs of the communities.
However, both the government ofﬁcials and BITO are making claims
for managing the funds, so actual payments await the resolution of
this discussion until currently.
Sumberjaya
Context
The Government’s belief that uncontrolled deforestation and
conversion to coffee on sloping land in Sumberjaya had led to a
serious increase in erosion that threatened the operation of the
newly constructed Way Besai hydropower dam and reduced water
availability for irrigated paddy rice downstream resulted in the
eviction of thousands of farmers from the forests between 1991
and 1996.
State of action
Since 2004, RUPES provided support to local communities to
gain access to the Indonesian Government’s Community Forestry
Program (Hutan Kemasyarakatan/HKm). The HKm program covered
70% of Sumberjaya’s protection forest, involved nearly 6400 farmers
and accounted for 13,000 ha. Farmers’ groups obtained 5-year
rights in protected forests envisioned towards 25-year rights, with
two requirements: to plant trees; and protect the remaining natural
forests. Besides, the HKm program, a pilot project with the com-
munity in two sub-catchment and PLN-SBDL (the hydropower
company) to develop a mechanism of payments for reducing
sediment through a River Care program. Farmers constructed check
dams, drainage along pathways and terraces. The River Care group
were to receive USD 1000 for a reduction of 30% or more, USD 700
for a 20–30% reduction, USD 500 for 10–20% and USD 250 for less
than 10%. At the end of the program, the community had executed
the contract with an 86% activity success rate. Analysis of sediment
concentration showed a 20% decrease by comparison with the
initial baseline. The 30% reduction target was not achieved. How-
ever, PLN-SBDL very much appreciated the community’s efforts in
reducing the sediment concentration in the Air Ringkih River and
gave a micro-hydropower unit as a reward, regardless of the results.
In 2014, the River Care has been in its third phase and progressively
scaled up to all Sumatran watershed by the PLN-SBDL.
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Bungo
Context
The Bungo old rubber agroforests or ‘jungle rubber’ are a corridor
bridging the national parks surrounding the area and act as an
increasingly important reservoir of forest diversity and other envir-
onmental services provided by natural forests. In recent years, the
enormous increase of oil palm plantations has led to a reduction in
the number of jungle rubber areas in Jambi.
State of action
The communities of Letung, Sangi, Mengkuang Besar, Mengkuang
Kecil and Lubuk Beringin villages agreed to retain their complex
rubber agroforests (total of about 2500 ha) if incentives were pro-
vided. The incentives local people requested included support to
establish microhydropower plants, setting up rubber nurseries and
demonstration plots of improved rubber agroforests, and clonal plants
of high-yielding rubber trees for intensively managed rubber gardens.
Conservation agreements were signed by these four villages in
2006. The incentives provided at the time were seen only as interim
while a more permanent reward mechanism was being developed.
An international tyre company is supporting jungle-rubber farmers
to improve the quality of their rubber and buying the rubber slabs
at the global market price, which is more transparent compared to
selling it to local traders. In 2009, the Minister of Forestry ofﬁcially
awarded the Hutan Desamanagement rights to Lubuk Beringin. The
permit of Hutan Desa is valid for 35 years and is renewable for
another 35 years subject to approval of annual work plans.
Cidanau
Context
Cidanau is an important watershed for the supply of domestic and
industrial water as well as protecting biodiversity. For almost the last
two decades, as an impact of rapid growth population Cidanau
watershed has experienced rapid land-use change from forestland
into agriculture with increased number of people living and illegally
practising farming in the upstream of the protected area.
State of action
The farming communities in the upstream areas of Cidanau
watershed were selected as the service providers. They were chosen
based on the critical aspect of their land, including steep slopes
prone to erosion. The state-owned water company (PT Krakatau
Tirta Industri), providing water to the Cilegon industrial area,
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (state-owned drinking water com-
pany) and PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (State Power Company,
acted as the buyers for the service. Forum Komunikasi DAS Cidanau
(Communication Forum of Cidanau Watershed) established in 1998
played the role of the intermediary, not only to assist the farmers
but also to be actively involved in administration and to monitor the
rehabilitation process. The price was decided through negotiations
with the buyer (KTI), the intermediary (FKDC) and the sellers
(farmers’ groups from four villages). In 2004, KTI signed an
agreement with FKDC to provide USD 95,000 in total to pay for
the environmental services that the watershed provided for ﬁve
years. The payment was distributed in instalments: USD 35,000 for
phase 1 in 2005–2007 and USD 40,000 for phase 2 in 2007–2009.
The third payment in the ﬁfth year was USD 20,000.
Singkarak
Context
The Minangkabau communities in West Sumatra have a unique
system of governance called ‘nagari’ as part of the Indonesia
decentralization process. The nagari system recognizes the tradi-
tional effectiveness of local communities in managing natural
resources. Logging activity in the past created thousands of
hectare of bare land, most of which has not recovered. Agricultural
activities in the uplands also helped create ‘alang–alang’ (Imperata
cylindrica) land in some parts. Government reforestation programs
within delineated protection forests had little success.
State of action
Previously, some scientists pointed to erosion around Lake Sing-
karak as the major problem and grassland reforestation as the main
way to enhance environmental services, particularly to increase
water supply for the downstream hydropower. However, an ICRAF
hydrological assessment revealed that reforestation might not be the
only solution and found that the change of inﬂow to Lake Singkarak
was also caused by the rainfall pattern and a hydropower plant.
Together with PLTA and local communities, RUPES established a
scheme to distribute royalties. This not only beneﬁted the commu-
nities through improvement of their economic condition but also had
advantages for electricity production. In 2005, Nagari Paninggahan
received almost USD 40,000 from the hydropower company, or USD
1 per person per year. Further, a voluntary carbon market project was
located on grassed and cleared upland areas in the foothills surro-
unding Paninggahan, a nagari in Singkarak. A contract was nego-
tiated between the service buyer, which was a company domiciled in
the Netherlands (CO2Operate BV), with the service seller, which was
the community of Paninggahan, represented by the ‘wali nagari’
(village leader).
Lantapan
Context
Lantapan’s rich natural resources and favourable climatic condi-
tions attracted migrant farmers and agribusinesses. The shift to
commercial agriculture by corporations and large landholders
pushed smallholders onto smaller plots in less productive and more
environmentally fragile areas. Similarly, the National Power Cor-
poration has over the years, experienced a power generation crisis
owing to the poor condition of the Pulangui Reservoir.
State of action
Several incentive policies at the national level existed in Lanta-
pan, such as ‘usufructury’ rights in the Integrated Social Forestry and
the Community-Based Forest Management programs run by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The Municipal
Government of Lantapan established a policy in 2001 that provided
incentives to farmers adopting contour farming. The Government
further established Ordinance no. 114 in 2009 (guided by a 5-year
Sustainable Farming System Investment Plan), an incentive-based
policy under which various forms of support are provided to farmers
and farmers’ organizations as rewards. The ordinance encourages
the adoption of, and investment in, sustainable farming and stabi-
lises the provision of environmental services in the watershed. Using
this policy as the framework, the hydropower company is imple-
menting a rewards’ mechanism for watershed services.
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